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A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term “normative 
reason”, is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is 
insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the respective motivation 
to act. I claim that such a criticism is based on the false supposition that rationality is to be identified with 
normal mental functioning. It is shown that for the rationalist internalists rationality does and should 
rather amount to inner psychological coherence, and that the respective conception of irrationality can 
account for all the purported counterexamples to the motivational internalism. In addition, I pinpoint 
that “full rationality” is neither an intuitive notion nor a necessary condition for the rationalist interna-
lism to hold, therefore, a line of criticism employing the notion misses the target.
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Rationalist Internalism
rationalist internalism today can be taken 
to present one of the most promising at-
tempts to defend a conditional variant of 
the motivational internalist thesis. the 
condition, under which the a priori neces-
sary relation between a moral judgement 
and motivation to act accordingly holds, is 
that of rationality of the agent. the whole 
argument that the rationalist internalist (rI) 
position consists in may be represented by 
Caj Strandberg’s flawless logical recon-
struction of it1 (Strandberg 2012: 6–7):
(1) Rationalism: It is conceptually nec-
essary that, for any action ф and any 
person S, if S judges that it is morally 
right for her to ф, then S judges that 
she has a normative reason2 to ф. 
1 Which is not to say that I agree with Strandberg’s 
further interpretation of each claim, however, the initial 
presentation of the argument expresses the rI position 
accurately.
2 First of all, I emphasize that the internalism/
externalism debate primarily concerns normative rea-
*  this publication is part of my research work 
at Lund University, financed by the Swedish Institute. 
I therefore cordially thank the SI for the scholarship. I 
am also grateful for the comments on the previous draft 
of this paper to the participants of the Higher seminar 
in practical philosophy at lund university and to Caj 
Strandberg (university of Gothenburg).
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(2) Normative internalism: It is concep-
tually necessary that, for any action ф 
and any rational person S, if S judges 
that she has a normative reason to ф, 
then S is motivated to ф.
(3) Rationalist internalism: It is concep-
tually necessary that, for any action 
ф and any rational person S, if S 
judges that it is morally right for her 
to ф, then S is motivated to ф. 
The first and the second premises in the 
argument, however, employ a notion that 
is ambiguous: should “normative reason” 
be read in its pro tanto or in its all things 
considered sense? My view is that there 
could well be two versions of the rI in 
virtue of the different meanings of “nor-
mative reason”, each subject to a different 
kind of criticism. therefore, one should be 
careful to specify which version one is dis-
cussing – defending or criticizing. 
sons, not motivating reasons. Thus, “reason”, unless 
noted otherwise, should be understood as a normative 
reason. Second, rationalists define reasons in terms of 
rationality: there are attempts to defend the rationalist 
internalist thesis without adhering to the definition of 
reasons in terms of rationality, as well as without en-
dorsing the whole argument (e.g., John Broome holds 
the rationalist internalist thesis correct in virtue of the 
principle of enkrasia). Only with this in mind, the first 
claim can be termed ‘rationalism’ in a more familiar 
way. I maintain that rationalism is in essence and from 
tradition, a view on the nature of morality: that moral 
truths are knowable by reason alone; thereof the content 
analysis of the moral judgement. However, I hold that 
acknowledging adherence to rationalism in moral phi-
losophy, one remains silent on whether there are other 
kinds of truths that can be determined by reason alone 
and on their strength. that is why I believe that to call 
oneself a rationalist implies only subscribing to the idea 
of moral normative reasons being determined by reason, 
but it does not imply subscribing to either pro tanto or 
all things considered reading of “reason”. 
Besides, defining reasons in terms of rationality 
does not compel to define rationality as responsiveness 
to reasons. I highlight this without here going into the 
matter. 
I take it that rather often the rational-
ist internalist position is by default under-
stood to necessarily require the prevalence 
of the moral, thus, the argument is read in 
the all things considered sense3. For ex-
ample, even Joshua Gert, intending to res-
titute the true reading of Michael Smith’s 
“reason”, falls prey to it: “It is possible to 
read much of what Michael Smith has writ-
ten and come away with the firm convic-
tion that he means to ally himself with the 
traditional moral rationalists, and that he 
holds that moral requirements are rational 
requirements” (Gert 2008: 1). But Smith 
does hold that moral requirements are ra-
tional requirements. The widespread mis-
interpretation is rather due to the default 
reading of “reason” as an all things con­
sidered reason, and therefrom thinking that 
what is required is all things considered as 
well4. Whereas Smith claims that “rational-
ism might now be taken to be … the claim 
that our concept of moral requirement is the 
concept of a reason for action; a require-
ment of rationality or reason” (Smith 1994: 
64–65; emphasis mine – I. V.). 
3 that may be due to the philosophical tradition 
where rationalism is mostly associated with Kant. also, 
perhaps it is because of the belief that the promises of 
internalism have to meet very high criteria? after all, 
the internalists claim to be able to explain why we ex-
pect a sincere person to act in accordance with her moral 
judgement (and so adding the ceteris paribus condition 
is much of a disappointment or acknowledgement of de-
feat?). I leave it unresolved.
4 Gert is preoccupied with refining the picture with 
the “permissible/required” distinction; he claims that 
some reasons rationally justify (permit), but not require 
certain actions, whereas others – not only justify, but 
also rationally require. Smith, however, does not make 
the distinction explicitly, but his “rationally required” 
in the pro tanto sense makes up for the “rationally per-
missible” to a certain extent. So Gert in (2008), before 
proceeding to critique of Smith’s account, is trying to do 
justice to Smith’s ‘reason’ restituting it the intended, but 
often missed pro tanto sense.  
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In this paper I will be interested pri-
marily in the version of rI that holds nor-
mative moral reasons to be primarily pro 
tanto normative reasons. this means that 
the clearly paradigmatic exemplar of this 
version is Michael Smith. there possibly 
being more of the adherents, reference to 
his theory, when needed, will be sufficient 
for making the point I aim at5. 
two targets of Criticism
there are two lines of criticism concern-
ing this variant of the rI that I would like 
to take on. First one of them is recurrent 
in several works of the critics of rI and 
threatens the rI thesis itself, i.e., claim (3). 
It asserts that the condition of rationality 
is insufficient for precluding some of the 
counterexamples to the motivational inter-
nalism. the other one is similar, but targets 
claim (2): the notion of rationality cannot 
secure the necessary relation between eve-
ry normative reason that an agent has and 
the motivation to act accordingly. I will ar-
gue that both lines of criticism fail because 
they rest on a false presupposition about 
the nature of rationality. let us explicate 
and respond to them in the order they were 
presented above. 
Criticism for the Claim (3)
this critical point is rather pervasive 
throughout the literature, however, it is 
grounded on a false supposition. as the rI 
5 I do not intend to talk in his or the rationalist inter-
nalists’ name, of course. It is rather probable that I make 
claims, especially when presenting my analysis of ratio-
nality as coherence, and elsewhere, that he would not 
subscribe to. that is my interpretation of his account, 
along with my own attempts to improve the rationalist 
internalist position. 
can easily deal with the counterarguments 
of accidie, depression and such, attributing 
motivational indifference to the irrational-
ity of the deliberators, critics have to target 
(ir)rationality itself. the criticism is main-
ly such that one or another conception of 
rationality is not able to secure the neces-
sary relation between a moral judgement 
and the relevant motivation that the rI is 
after.
let me outline the usual strategy the 
critics of the rI employ, and only then 
proceed to the personalia. a critic selects 
a conception of rationality and applies it to 
some cases. the selected conception then 
proves to be not apt enough to cover all the 
cases of motivational indifference: there 
are cases in which people can be consid-
ered rational or even entirely rational even 
without being motivated to act in accord-
ance with their moral judgements. there-
fore, it is said that rationality (or at least 
some plausible conception of rationality)6 
is not the right condition to secure the 
necessary relation between a moral judge-
ment and the respective moral motivation. 
therefore, the rI fails and motivational 
internalism is false.
the problem with this strategy is that 
these criticisms are based on a different 
conception of rationality than that of rI. 
Hence this approach only shows an ap-
parent thing: RI does not work with the 
conceptions of rationality more or less 
randomly chosen by critics. this is not 
to say that none of the critics tried to ap-
proach the rI with the conception of ra-
6 Any other definitions that could account for all 
the cases of motivational indifference, it is argued, are 
either ad hoc or issue in other serious problems (e.g., 
Zangwill also argues for the latter in 2008: 116). So the 
same conclusion follows anyway. 
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tionality, and, accordingly, irrationality, 
that is supposedly presumed by the rI. 
Various philosophers have advanced this 
criticism from different perspectives on 
what rationality amounts to: the “follow-
through” account, the instrumental and the 
(supposedly) common-sense conceptions 
of rationality. However, they all share one 
crucial feature: they attribute normal men-
tal functioning to rationality as its core 
element, whereas irrationality necessar-
ily indicates abnormal or impaired mental 
functioning. It is true that in many cases 
the internalists and externalists list various 
cases of mental malfunctioning as the ap-
parent cases that internalism must account 
for if it is to be held plausible, but it is not 
sufficient to conclude that irrationality has 
to be identified with mental abnormality. I 
will argue that this element is not a neces-
sary component of “irrationality” at all – at 
least given the way the rI understands it. 
Irrationality  
and Mental Abnormality
let us see the described criticism in action. 
For instance, elinor Mason supposes that, 
according to internalism, “it is abnormal 
in some way not to do the action you be-
lieve you ought to do” (Mason 2008: 150). 
However, she argues that we can imagine 
the whole scale of the indifference, at one 
end of which we find people with brain 
damage, some more familiar cases of acci-
die, rage, grief and laziness in the middle, 
and the wilful ignoring at the other end. In 
other words, it ranges from what “normal 
agents wouldn’t do”, “cases of faultiness”, 
the “abnormal” (which she considers to be 
what the rI can in some way account for), 
to the weak-will or wilful wrongdoing 
which is “perfectly normal, and depress-
ingly common” (Mason 2008: 150–1).
actually Mason’s conception of ra-
tionality (in her 2008) comes quite close 
to the one employed by the rI7, but she 
still makes this presupposition about the 
essence of (ir)rationality, which allows us 
to align her with the rest of the critics. Her 
main point here is that the cases of indif-
ference do not necessarily indicate cases 
of mental impairment (and, in addition, 
even the cases of impairment might not be 
what we would call cases of irrationality), 
and irrationality is identified with exactly 
just that. therefore, she concludes that as 
“internalists have given us no reason for 
thinking that not doing what you think 
you ought to indicates a problem with the 
agent, so no reason for believing in moti-
vational internalism” (Mason 2008: 153). 
Nick Zangwill and Caj Strandberg also 
claim that cases of moral motivational in-
difference they have given do not seem to 
be cases of irrationality. Zangwill agrees 
that the listless or the depressed are obvi-
ously irrational, but not some others who 
are just “morally cold”, “bad” or otherwise 
“rationally indifferent”. The latter seem to 
be “perfectly content and well balanced”, 
“even … quite happy”, “normal”, their 
“mental faculties … seem to be in order” 
(Zangwill 2008: 113–4). 
According to Strandberg, the “term 
“irrational” is used to categorize various 
failures of mental functioning”, but “the 
7 Mason distinguishes between theoretical, means-
end and follow through conceptions of rationality, where 
the latter is “a matter of believing what you believe that 
you have reason to believe, or doing what you believe 
you have reason to do—i.e., following through” (Mason 
2008: 147). However, the very classification she intro-
duces and formulation of the follow through principle is 
enough to indicate that she understands it in a different 
way than the rI presupposes.
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examples I have discussed all provide 
evidence that it is not conceptually neces-
sary for the person in those examples to be 
mentally malfunctioning in any relevant 
way” (Strandberg 2012: 11). 
Rationality as Coherence
But what about the conception of rational-
ity that the rI implies, what does it amount 
to? I claim that rationality for the rI is and 
should be identified primarily with psy-
chological coherence. All the requirements 
of rationality can finally be reduced to re-
quirements of coherence. It is not a novel 
idea, but perhaps one that has not been 
taken seriously enough. Various authors, 
for a clear example, John Broome (2010), 
Donald Davidson (2004), Smith (1994, 
1996, 2001, 2004, and elsewhere), when 
talking about (ir)rationality, talk about 
the inner (in)coherence or (in)consistency 
of mind. On this view, rationality is just 
taken to be a notion defining the relation 
among some person’s psychological states 
in terms of coherence. and so the different 
conditions for rationality can all be spelled 
out in terms of coherence of various kinds. 
If so, this would mean that there can be 
principles of rationality for connecting 
different kinds of states or sets of states 
of human psychology by the same type of 
relation (coherence). then even practical 
and theoretical rationality would not be 
differing substantially, the difference in 
labels would only signal that coherence is 
required between different kinds of psy-
chological states, or elements (say, beliefs 
of different kinds, and beliefs and desires, 
or so). With respect to which elements 
should cohere and how8 for a person to be 
8 For example, interpersonal coherence (of beliefs 
or preferences), intrapersonal coherence (of preferences, 
recognized as rational, we could analyti-
cally discern different kinds of rationality 
requirements, or principles. 
If rationality is understood this way, 
then the concept of full rationality in the 
practical context boils down to the perva-
sive requirement of coherence among all 
of the relevant psychological elements, 
involved in a certain practical decision. 
that way, the idea behind the rI is rather 
simple, and there is nothing mysterious in 
attributing irrationality to the addicts, oth-
ers of the kind and even people without di-
agnoses: those, violating the requirements 
of rationality, are simply incoherent (and 
not necessarily mentally malfunctioning or 
abnormal). 
the possibility of such a conception of 
rationality, however, should have its roots 
in our everyday language usage, as not 
only motivational internalists themselves, 
but also some of their critics turn to this 
court of appeal for the evaluation of plau-
sibility of the rI claims. and I claim that 
such an analysis of rationality, as roughly 
sketched above, is available. 
It seems first of all, though, that the 
word “rationality” is itself a philosopher’s 
term of art, not so much a word used by 
the folk. For example, in his work Gert 
claims: “Of course I do not mean to ap-
peal to intuitions about the use of the very 
word ‘irrational’, much less to the phrase 
‘subjectively irrational’. The first of these 
is rarely used by normal people, and the 
second is a technical term” and “That is, 
‘subjectively irrational’ is meant to collect 
the spectrum of actions that range from 
‘silly’ and ‘stupid’, through ‘boneheaded’ 
etc.), intrapersonal synchronic or diachronic coherence 
etc.
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and ‘a bad idea,’ all the way up to ‘crazy’, 
‘insane’, and worse” (Gert 2004: 143). I 
can only agree with this, and, taking over 
Gert’s idea, rather look in the everyday 
language for the words either expressive 
of the same idea as “rational” or at least 
partly expressive of it. I shall look for the 
words which are expressive of success or 
failure to adhere to some kind of require-
ments of reason.
In everyday language ”rational” may 
correspond to “prudent”, “wise”, “clever”, 
“sound”, “sensible”, “reasonable”, “sane”, 
and the like. In other words, we may cat-
egorize actions or agents with these at-
tributes as “rational”. Of course, each 
of these words has wider meaning than 
“rational”, as well as differing connota-
tions (functional, emotional or other kind 
of nuances). they might even have more 
than one meaning; however, roughly, we 
can think like this. It seems that “sensible” 
are those who judge or act in accordance 
with the situation as represented to one 
by one’s senses. “Clever” may be those 
who manage to find the relevant means to 
some end. “Prudent” are probably the ones 
who presently act so as not to compromise 
their future interests. and so on. From this 
it seems not too far-fetched to notice that 
they all share part of their meaning or, at 
least, have the family resemblance: they 
all signal an instance of coherence among 
some elements or sets of elements (deci-
sions-senses, means-ends, present inter-
ests-future interests, etc.).
As for “irrational”, there are several 
words partly corresponding to it in every-
day language, primarily, “silly”, “stupid”, 
“crazy”, “insane”, “nonsense”, etc. Ac-
cording to the Merriam-Webster diction-
ary, we can find such definitions or parts of 
them: “exhibiting a lack of common sense 
or sound judgement”, “contrary to good 
sense”, and so on. These irrationalities are 
due to the discrepancies with respect to the 
standards or to those who hold to or em-
body those standards; actions fail to cohere 
with the standards (of reason). In other 
words, they are used to signal situations 
where one of the requirements of coher-
ence is infringed, i.e., when there is some 
kind of incoherence in between some ele-
ments or sets of elements within a person’s 
mind. Once again, the meanings of these 
words are not equivalent to that of “irra-
tional”, but wider. Also, we can notice that 
rationality of some action or agent can be 
judged against some intersubjective stand-
ards, not just against the knowledge of that 
particular person’s current goals (and this 
is to the contrary as to what the adherents 
to the narrow view – instrumental rational-
ity – could agree with).
So “irrational” neither explains the er-
ror nor is used to evaluate the mental status 
or character of the person that it is attrib-
uted to. “Irrational” just records an error 
and categorizes it: the one of incoherence. 
Presumably, irrationality can explain why 
the necessary relation between the moral 
judgement and motivation does not hold, 
but irrationality itself must be explained – 
by naming its causes or otherwise. 
Certainly, mental malfunctioning can 
be such an explanation, but it is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for ir-
rationality, as we know that addicted peo-
ple can quit their addictions, or do some 
rational actions even under the influence of 
their addictions, as well as the depressed 
are not entirely irrational. Smith agrees 
with Stocker: “The point is not that agents 
suffering from such maladies are neces-
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sarily irrational: they may or may not be” 
(Smith 1994: 155)9 .
as far as I am concerned, various terms 
of mental conditions categorize a recur-
rent behavioural pattern. to call somebody 
“depressed” or “addicted” is to categorize 
a recurring psychological state on the ba-
sis of the character of their recurrent errors 
of incoherence (between that person’s own 
best practical judgment of some kind and 
motivation to act accordingly). the de-
pressed lack the relevant desire or perhaps 
a desire of a significant strength for self-
regarding actions10, and in the addicted the 
desire for a drug is prevailing. But these 
or other similar labels do not deem these 
people for complete irrationality.
To call somebody “irrational” is prima­
rily to record somebody’s singular action11 
as falling short of one of the requirements 
9 It is rather that “Desires are irrational to the extent 
that they are wholly and solely the product of psycho-
logical compulsions, physical addictions, emotional dis-
turbances and the like; to the extent that they wouldn’t 
be had by someone in a non-depressed, non-addictive, 
non-emotionally disturbed state” (Smith 1994: 155). 
this means that it is only those desires that cannot pos-
sibly be shared by the well mentally functioning and the 
impaired, are necessarily irrational. the ones that can be 
shared can be rational or irrational – it depends on other 
things. In other words, irrational desires are those that 
are had by, e.g., the depressed as depressed, the ones on 
the basis of which they are characterized as depressed.
10 M. Cholbi in his paper (2011) claims that empiri-
cal evidence points to the conclusion that the depressed 
usually lack in self-regarding motivation rather than the 
moral one, and that is to the contrary of what is popular-
ly presupposed in the internalism/externalism debate.
11 I sometimes say that “(ir)rationality” can be at-
tributed to actions or agents, where there is not much 
difference in between the agent and action: you are what 
you do. However, I advocate the view that one action is 
not enough to define an identity, therefore, “(ir)rational” 
first of all describes agent in face of one’s singular ac-
tion, and does not give an overall evaluation of one’s 
character, unless in the context where the agent is evalu-
ated in relation to one’s more recurrent actions or pat-
terns of actions.
of rationality (coherence requirement of 
some kind). So far, I have not discovered, 
therefore, that “(ab)normality of mental 
functioning” should be a necessary part of 
the meaning of the “(ir)rational”12.
We can go even further and look at our 
own everyday lives. How many times per 
day, being mentally well-functioning, we 
act irrationally? Perhaps when we pro-
crastinate because of some fear or while 
trying to avoid some, even minor, incon-
venience? Or maybe when we are lazy or 
just tired and so do not pick up the tasks 
that we acknowledge it would be best 
for us to do now? Or when in the morn-
ing the alarm clock goes on and you turn 
it off telling yourself that you will be up 
in five minutes, at the same time not be-
lieving this at all; perhaps even knowing 
that it will not happen, and knowing it is 
best for you to get up right now, but not 
doing it. When you knowingly succumb to 
the lure of advertising and buy something 
you do not need? are you being irrational? 
I would say that in all of these and many 
other cases we are irrational, and even by 
our own lights, if we are sincere enough to 
acknowledge it. 
therefore, contrary to the position of 
the rI critics, I hold irrationality to be a 
pervasive phenomenon of everyone’s daily 
life, not just some abnormality that neces-
sarily happens only to the psychologically 
impaired. I claim that the group of words 
(necessarily or not) referring to (or possible 
to categorize as) “irrational” is wider than 
that which would refer to the “abnormally 
mentally functioning”, and that the lat-
ter does not necessarily entail the former. 
12 Even the aforementioned “insane”, “crazy”, 
“nonsense” and the like.
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What matters to attribution of the “(ir)ra-
tional” is whether the coherence relation 
of some kind holds (or not), not whether 
the person is functioning normally. to put 
it otherwise, it is not in virtue of the poor 
functioning of the brain that one is irra­
tional, but in virtue of one’s psychological 
states being incoherent. and the poor men-
tal functioning is among those factors that 
sometimes can explain – not necessarily 
as causal explanations – the incoherence: 
“Rage, passion, depression, distraction, 
grief, physical or mental illness: all these 
things could cause us to act irrationally” 
(Korsgaard 1986: 13).
So at this point we are already able 
to answer the critics of the rI that their 
critique based on the presupposition that 
rationality necessarily implies normal 
mental functioning, fails. It is quite to the 
contrary of what they claim: the ordinary 
usage of the term “rational” and its cog-
nates indicates that rationality, as well as 
irrationality, are attributes that pertain to 
those who function normally and are “even 
happy” equally well as to those who do not 
– depending on the characteristics of their 
singular actions or decisions. Irrationality 
is not a diagnosis; it is because of the di-
agnosis that it can be pardoned, in some 
sense justified, or at least understood.
Criticism towards the Claim (2)
Similarly, but even more pressingly, goes 
Strandberg’s argument targeted at claim 
(2). He suggests to consider some cases in 
which a person has more than one norma-
tive reason for action. In one such case, 
a seriously ill person is presented with a 
certain available medical treatment and its 
side effect. then, she has two incompat-
ible reasons: to ф (the act being “to accept 
the medical treatment”, for the reason that 
it will save her life) and to Ѱ (“to decline 
the treatment”, reason being that because 
of the treatment she will not be able to 
drink coffee for one minute). according 
to the normative internalism claim, even if 
this person considers the reason for ф-ing 
to be “absolutely the strongest reason”, 
and that one for Ѱ-ing an “extremely much 
weaker” reason, she has to be motivated to 
do both, “in order to be entirely rational; 
... she must be irrational to a certain ex-
tent unless she is motivated to act in that 
way” (Strandberg 2012: 9). However, 
Strandberg thinks we can hold her entirely 
rational even if she is not motivated (even 
to some extent) to decline the treatment, 
or, on the other hand, that she may be so 
motivated, even if she is rational. So the 
consideration of the presented case shows 
that competent language users need not 
agree that someone not motivated to act on 
an extremely much weaker reason (that is 
not motivated even to some extent) is nec-
essarily irrational. therefore, the intuitive 
conception of (ir)rationality to which, ac-
cording to Strandberg, rationalist internal-
ists purportedly appeal cannot secure the 
conceptually necessary relation between 
all and every reason and motivation to act 
accordingly. 
In so far as Strandberg’s position re-
lies on the conception of rationality that is 
misconstrued, as I have already shown, we 
have answered his worry. However, there 
is more to this critique: it seems that we 
can hold the person from the case rational 
(i.e. coherent) as well. Should the insig-
nificant incoherence (not responding with 
motivation to the weakest of reasons) in-
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fluence our judgement of the person? This 
is a sensible question to ask. 
Strandberg’s own position is such that 
in the cases he considers we hold such a 
person entirely rational. I suppose that here 
Strandberg is criticizing Smith’s conception 
of full rationality, and does it by appealing 
to our intuitive understanding of full ration-
ality. So let us now turn to Smith. 
Smith: Conceptions  
of full and Practical Rationality
Smith’s “full rationality”, though, is not 
and should not, as I will claim further on, 
be an intuitive notion, therefore, one can-
not intuit whether somebody is fully ra-
tional or not. According to Smith, “the idea 
of someone’s being fully rational is itself 
a summary notion. the role of this idea in 
the analysis is thus to capture, in summary 
style, a whole host of more specific plati-
tudes about practical rationality” (Smith 
1994: 155-6). The difference between full 
rationality and rationality of some other 
kind, say, practical rationality (in its nar-
row sense), must be highlighted. 
Smith adopts a slightly reinterpreted 
version of the conception of full rational-
ity given by Bernard Williams which is 
spelled out in three conditions: 
the agent must have no false be-(i) 
liefs
the agent must have all relevant (ii) 
true beliefs
the agent must deliberate correctly (iii) 
(Smith 1994: 156).
Smith, though, explicates the third 
condition differently than Williams13. as 
13 I leave out of this paper explication and discus-
sion of Williams’ account of “correct deliberation” as 
irrelevant for our purposes.
rational deliberation is taken to be a way 
of generating new and extinguishing old 
desires, it is to be such as to sanction only 
the desires of an appropriate kind. Smith 
believes that we deliberate, i.e., generate 
new and extinguish old desires “by try-
ing to integrate the object of that desire 
into a more coherent and unified desid-
erative profile and evaluative outlook” 
(Smith 1994: 159). And this procedure 
is “straightforwardly analogous” to what 
rawls says about beliefs. So Smith takes 
the third condition of correct deliberation 
to be the condition of attempt at system-
atic justification. In other words, he takes 
it to consist in a procedure very similar to 
the Rawlsian “reflective equilibrium”: it is 
a process of systematic justification of our 
desires. that means that full rationality is 
defined by the idealized epistemic condi-
tions (i)and (ii) and the requirement of co-
herence (condition (iii) explicated differ-
ently than by Williams).
First of all, these are conditions for 
reason and moral judgement formation, as 
for Smith the moral judgement consists in 
a belief that one would desire that one φs 
in circumstances C if one had a maximally 
informed and coherent and unified desire 
set. So the conditions define, first of all, an 
idealized deliberator, not the actual delib-
erator. However, for a person to actually 
be fully rational, one has to, other things 
being equal14, have the desire to φ in C, in 
the face of the aforementioned belief (that 
one would desire that one oneself φs in C if 
one had a maximally informed and coher-
ent and unified desire set), and that belief 
to be true. 
14 Keeping presupposed that it is because of the be-
lief, and not just accidentally, that the desire is had. 
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So even if a person is motivated to do 
something that one believes one has a rea-
son to do, but that belief is not true, Smith 
would say that such person’s “overall psy-
chological state cannot be maximally co-
herent” (Smith 1997: 100, n. 18), that she 
is not fully rational, but we would grant her 
“practical rationality” narrowly conceived. 
Practical rationality requires us to have the 
desires that we believe we would have be-
ing fully rational (Smith 2007: 288). And 
this type of rationality is fully compatible 
with theoretical irrationality, “a failure in 
the way she forms her judgment as to what 
is desirable” (Pettit, Smith 1993: 59). 
So those who desire to do what they be-
lieve they have a reason to do, are at least 
practically rational, and if those beliefs are 
true (they would indeed desire precisely 
that, were they fully rational), then, other 
things being equal, they are even fully ra-
tional. 
this analysis needs to be accompanied 
by a couple of cautions. “Fully rational” 
(as already noted about the “rational”) 
does not characterize a person in general 
(as if one was immune to irrationalities 
at any point in time, or in all one’s deci-
sions, or rational “in general” or so), but 
only in relation to some action or decision. 
It means, one’s certain action15 is beyond 
rational criticism. Besides, “fully rational” 
here is first of all defined in relation to one 
15 I take it that “action” here is described normative-
ly, that is by citing one’s normative reason, perhaps, to-
gether with the moral judgement, or so. Here I leave the 
motivational reasons discussion out. It may very well be 
that I should explicate requirements for full rationality 
even more, that is, add that the strength of the normative 
practical judgement should cohere with the strength of 
the corresponding motivation to act accordingly. I pre-
suppose this, even if arguing for the need of it is to be 
left for another publication.
reason, or in a pro tanto sense16. thus a 
weird sounding result in Standberg’s cas-
es: one can be “fully rational” with regard 
to one reason, and not “fully rational” with 
regard to another. However, I believe that 
it is a minor linguistic problem, a price one 
has to pay for choosing as one’s basic unit 
the pro tanto reasons. The final or overall 
“full rationality” of the decision or action 
(all things considered) would depend on 
the full rationality of each and every minor 
decision anyway.
as already said, we can talk about dif-
ferent “rationalities”, or requirements of 
coherence among different elements or 
sets of elements of psyche (or elements 
and sets of elements). Hence the differing 
meanings of “rationality” (and, accord-
ingly, of “irrationality”). One person can 
judge someone as rational, and another can 
judge the same person irrational, but in dif-
ferent respects (for example, as the one in 
whom the means cohere with the goals set, 
and as the one in whom the goals set do 
not cohere with the goals to be set, etc.). 
However, the fully rational is the one who 
satisfies all of the relevant requirements of 
coherence and so is immune to any further 
rational critique (with regard to a specific 
action). We can talk about “rationality”, of 
course, as about “full rationality”, having 
the (pervasive) requirement of coherence 
in mind. But equally well we can, analyti-
cally, talk about rationalities, where “ra-
tional” signals that some of the coherence 
requirements has or have been met, “ra-
tional” being used as a narrow notion in-
16 “Action”, therefore, is not a description of an 
actual action, but of the possible one – it is a norma-
tive description. We are discussing, for the moment, the 
normative aspect of it.
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dicating coherence of some psychological 
states of an agent. If we think about ration-
ality in the wide sense (as “full rational-
ity”), then we can even talk about degrees 
of rationality. 
Less than full Rationality  
and satisfied intuitions
If we can accept the analysis of full ration-
ality and the accompanying considerations 
that I have presented so far, then it should 
be clear that any single linguistic intuition 
of the competent language users cannot re-
liably track “full rationality”, and that “ra-
tional” is usually used to denote only one 
or another instance of (not full) coherence. 
I claim that an adequate notion of “full ra-
tionality” is to comprise all those instances 
of coherence that are traced by competent 
language users in their usage of the cor-
responding “thick” notions. Rationality 
is defined positively by words expressive 
of coherence, and negatively – by words 
expressive of failures in coherence. How-
ever, none of the “thick” notions taken on 
their own can define and no separate intui-
tions can track full rationality. therefore, 
criticism based on the presupposition that 
intuitively we hold people fully (or entire-
ly) rational has no force. 
Moreover, if the concept “rational” can 
be attributed to people exhibiting far less 
than perfect rationality, then the rationalist 
internalists can share Strandberg’s intui-
tions, and still deny his conclusion. It seems 
that, as full rationality consists in a whole 
set of requirements of coherence, irration-
ality can occur as infringement of any one 
of these. Smith uses such phrases as “full 
rationality” and “pure practical rational-
ity”, “local” and “global” coherence, and 
“even more global requirements of coher-
ence”, setting even the “minimal standard 
of local coherence”17, which indicates the 
existence of quite a spectrum of rational-
ity. this means, that referring to the exam-
ples in Strandberg’s paper, one could agree 
that we do find people rational if they are 
motivated to act in the way backed by the 
“absolutely strongest reason”. However, 
we may not hold such a person entirely ra­
tional, as being exempt from any rational 
criticism – if only because she is incoher-
ent with respect to one‘s weaker reason. 
though in fact, to hold one entirely ration-
al we should know much more (we have 
clarified the conditions for full rationality 
before). However, to be sure, for the rI to 
be true it is enough that the person is prac-
tically rational, it is not necessary that she 
is fully rational. 
So we have an appropriate answer to 
Strandberg’s claim that “even if the con-
siderations I have offered do not defeat 
(2), they provide evidence against it, since 
they suggest that competent language us-
ers may reasonably doubt it” (Strandberg 
2012: 12). The competent language us-
ers will attribute rationality to the person 
in question, recognizing one’s coherence 
in one respect, but they can equally well 
attribute this same person irrationality in 
another respect, or say, all in all, that such 
a person is rational, but apparently not en-
tirely; maybe – irrational to some extent. 
The “fully rational” self is exempt from 
rational criticism; however, our less than 
fully rational selves can be vulnerable to 
17 Necessary for somebody to count as an agent 
at all (Smith 2004: 107). Here he is entering into the 
sphere of motivational reasons as well, but it does not 
change my point.
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rational criticism because of some or an-
other infringement of coherence require-
ment, and still be rational as complying 
with some other coherence requirement(s). 
For example, people can be practically ra-
tional, that is, exhibit coherence of one’s 
normative belief and desire to act accord-
ingly, and “may still fall far short of full ra-
tionality: that is, their desires may not yet 
be maximally informed and coherent and 
unified” (Smith 1997: 100, n. 18). 
What they really need not to adhere to, 
is that such a person is somehow globally, 
totally or very irrational. But this can be 
accepted by the rI as well. However, the 
competent language users do not need to 
intuit that any person is fully rational, for 
that, they would need to reflect. 
Conclusions
to recapitulate, I claim that the criticism 
to the extent that rationality is an insuf-
ficient condition to secure the necessary 
relation that the rationalist internalism is 
after, fails. at least the version of the rI 
that consists in an argument with the pro 
tanto reading of the “normative reason”, 
and in so far as the conception of rational-
ity employed is that of psychological co-
herence of the agent, is on good grounds. 
Both the criticism targeted at claim (3) and 
the one targeted at claim (2) rely on the 
wrong supposition about rationality. The first 
line of criticism holds that irrationality neces-
sarily implies mental malfunctioning of the 
agent. However, the analysis of the folk us-
age of the terms defining rationality speaks 
in favour of the element of mental coherence 
rather than that of normal mental functioning 
as their common denominator. the second 
line, along with the aforementioned flaw, in 
addition misinterprets the notion of full ra-
tionality, which is actually neither intuitive 
nor a necessary condition for the rI to hold. 
therefore, the criticism based on the intui-
tions of the competent language users that the 
motivationally indifferent need not be fully 
irrational, leaves the rI untouched as well.
So based on what I’ve said, I believe we 
can see that an account of rationality is apt 
enough to secure the necessary relation be-
tween the moral judgements (as well as the 
normative reasons in the second premise) 
and the respective motivation, whereas the 
resulting account of irrationality – to ac-
count for all the cases of motivational in-
difference. 
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RACIoNALUMAS: NoRMALUS PSICHINIS fUNKCIoNAVIMAS AR PSICHoLogINIS  
KoHeReNtIŠKUMAS?
ieva vasilionytė
S a n t r a u k a
tapatintinas veikiau su vidiniu veikėjo psichologijos 
koherentiškumu, o atitinkama iracionalumo sam-
prata pajėgi apimti visus motyvaciniam interna-
lizmui tariamai prieštaraujančius atvejus. Taip pat 
patikslinama, jog „visiškas racionalumas“ nėra nei 
intuityvi sąvoka, nei būtina sąlyga racionalistinio 
internalizmo teisingumui, todėl kritika, besiremianti 
šia sąvoka, nepasiekia tikslo.
pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalistinis interna-
lizmas, racionalumas, koherentiškumas, visiškas ra-
cionalumas, pro tanto normatyvus pagrindas.
